Design and Engineering of the Safety Instrumented System (SIS) involves both hardware and application software design, using only compliant components with the correct hardware fault tolerance.
Clause 14 of IEC 61511 – describing the approach to SIS Design and Engineering – makes up 11 of the 77 pages of Part 1 of the standard. There is much detail to absorb, but in summary the Clause describes:
IEC 61511 provides relatively little guidance on how the SIS Application Program should be developed – but this limited guidance is appropriate for programming with “Limited Variability Languages” (LVL). Examples of such languages would be ladder logic, function block diagram and structured text. These languages are very constrained (or “limited” - hence LVL). The logic solver will be programmed by way of the product suppliers programming tool / engineering workbench. This programming environment will usually be further constrained by preventing any “unsafe” programming actions within the programming tool.
More complex, powerful programming languages (such as “C”) are known as “Fully Variable Languages” (FVL). These could be used to develop the logic solver’s application program – but these powerful languages need a different level of control in order for them to be employed in safety applications. Since they are so flexible, it would be entirely possible to implement an “unsafe” approach. It follows that the rule set for programming in an environment such as this would need to be very robust and comprehensive. Such rules for programming are found in IEC 61508 Part 3 (“Software Requirements”). This document provides more than 100 pages of guidance and is supported by other informative parts of IEC 61508. Use of FVL languages is normally restricted to product suppliers developing the operating systems for logic solvers. It would be unusual for the Application Program to be developed in this way. It is allowed by IEC 61511 to develop Application Program using an FVL language – but this must be done to the ruleset in IEC 61508 Part 3 (>100 pages) rather than to the ruleset within IEC 61511 Clause 12 (5 pages).
Project is to determine whether the Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) for an installed SIS meets the target PFD of 0.1 presented in the LOPA review. The PFD calculated for the SIF was then incorporated into an update to the LOPA.
Industry: Mining / Metal / CementFollowing several inspections by the UK Competent Authority (HSE), a project to deliver an alarm review process for several UK sites. The project comprised: Phase 1 – Undertake an Alarm Review. The outputs being a provisional master alarm database, a draft alarm response manual and a proposed action list, (these documents to be finalised in phase 2). Phase 2 – Actions Close Out and Update. Phase 1 generated several actions to be resolved, by the software owner (how alarms actually activate, what executive actions they have). Phase 2 also updated the master alarm database and alarm response manual. Phase 3 – KPI Introduction. Began measuring the KPIs required and instigated regular alarm review sessions for the site, as defined by the Alarm Handling Policy, Phase 4 – Introduction of Alarm updates. Defined and began the process, set priority levels, deleted unneeded alarms and implemented wider changes to bring the BPCS in line with the new policy.
Industry: Brewing and DistillingProject to carry out a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) Safety Integrity Level (SIL) and Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) Calculation Verification on four SIFs.
Industry: Mining / Metal / CementProject to investigate client's approach to HAZOP, LOPA and PFD Calculation where multiple SIFs protect a single hazard. Confirm whether approach CCF used is in line with current best practice.
Industry: ChemicalProject to carry out SIL Verification and confirmation of PFD calculations for x22 SIF's.
Industry: Oil and Gas OnshoreE: support@methodfs.com. T: 44 (0)1462 713313. W: www.methodfs.com